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THE LUCE LECTURES ON RELIGION AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS
Morality in Plague Time:
AIDS in Theological Perspective
Lecture 3: Virtues - Protecting the Healthy
Gilbert Meilaender

What you see and hear depends a good deal on where you are
standing; it also depends on what sort of person you are.'
The city of New York recently began a pilot program distributing sterile
needles to drug addicts in the hope of determining whether such a policy
might help in curbing the spread of AIDS. Such programs or suggested
programs have, of course, been highly controversial, since - in the name
of public health - they seem to condone behavior which is both immoral
and illegal. Responding to anticipated criticisms of this sort, the New York
State Health Commissioner who had approved the plan, was ·quoted as
saying: "As a public health official, I don't have the luxury to be a
moralist. "2
It ought to be a source of constant amazement to us that a culture in
which people so endlessly deplore the loss of "values" and breakdown of
"community" should - on almost every occasion of facing a difficult
social problem - respond with ritualistic and formulaic incantations
which drive a wedge between the community and the values which might
sustain its common life. The problem facing the Health Commissioner
was, to be sure, a difficult one, not because it asked him to bracket morality
from consideration, but because it called for considerable powers of moral
discernment. The same is true of many of the other AIDS-related issues
which have received wide public debate. They are almost always moral
problems - having to do with obligations of caregivers, the meaning of
responsible action on the part ofthose who are HIV+, circumstances under
which confidentiality may properly be broken, the degree to which the
freedom of an individual at risk may be restricted for the sake of fiscally
sound insurance coverage. On occasions like these, we are usually
struggling to achieve different and seemingly incompatible goods. And the
claim that we haven't the luxury to be moralists very probably is little more
than an announcement of our intention to ignore the primafacie claims of
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one ofthese goods upon us. We remove the complexity of the moral life by
focusing our attention on some single moral principle or single good to be
realized.
Perhaps such single-minded ness is sometimes necessary. But when we
move too quickly in this direction, we limit our powers of discernment. By
permitting ourselves the "luxury" of moral reflection, we may come to
think more deeply about a problem or see possibilities which had not
previously been apparent to us. With that in mind, I turn now to think
about just one of the issues which has been important in public debates
about AIDS, and I propose to think about it from a deliberately moral
perspective.
Few issues have generated greater passion than that of AIDS and
schools - the presence of children with AIDS or teachers with AIDS in
the classroom. For the most part our public debates have approached
these questions from predictable angles - weighing costs and benefits of
different courses of action, or milking a single principle like equality for as
much practical payoff as possible. I intend to begin elsewhere in thinking
about this problem. Our focus will be not what we ought to do, but what
sorts of persons we should be if we are to deal appropriately with the
problems for schools which the AIDS epidemic raises. For this disease
forces us to think about suffering and dying, about what it means to live
within a community, about fear and how it should be faced, about
uncertainty, about sexuality. To approach the question from this angle,
focusing on moral character, may even turn out to be a helpful way to
think about a hard question. Perhaps such difficulties are best faced, and
most creatively examined, by a certain sort of person - one characterized
by the cardinal virtues.
A Return to Moral Language

Adopting this perspective has the advantage of encouraging us to return
to some of the oldest moral language in our cultural history. In Plato's
Symposium, a number of different speakers at a banquet take turns
speaking in praise of love. And when Agathon, the banquet's host, has his
turn, he organizes his talk around the virtues of prudence, justice, courage,
and temperance. Already at that time these categories seem to have been
taken for granted as a useful way to think about morality, and they have
since become a staple of Western moral thought.3 To these four cardinal
virtues, Christian thought added the three theological virtues of faith,
hope, and love. I shall concentrate upon the cardinal virtues themselves part of our common cultural inheritance - though they may on occasion
entice us to think about the theological virtues as well. These four virtues
are excellences of character which enable a human being, in the words of
Josef Pieper, "to attain the furthest potentialities of his nature."4 This
makes clear from the outset that we are not attempting to stand on morally
neutral, "value free," ground. Any discussion of the virtues will reflect
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beliefs about human nature and its possibilities, about what it means to
flourish as a human being within a community of others like ourselves.
From this perspective we must be moralists - not as a luxury, but out of
necessity. The very problems we perceive and the way we describe those
problems, are shaped by the virtues that characterize us. "As persons of
character," Stanley Hauerwas once wrote, "we do not confront situations
as mud puddles into which we have to step; rather the kind of 'situations'
we confront and how we understand them are a function of the kind of
people we are ."5 Given certain traits of character, we may be able to see
those mud puddles as occasions for rejoicing and being rid of our shoes.
The virtues, therefore, do not just equip us to deal with problems; they
influence what we see, the problems and possibilities we envision, the
details we think significant. They do not simply fit us for life; they help
shape life. 6
Prudence, that most misunderstood of the virtues, has pride of place,
and, in fact, it demands the bulk of our attention . In our minds, prudence
and courage are likely to seem a strange pair. The prudent man or woman
is , for us, simply cautious and careful - perhaps a bit timid. Think of
prudence in that way, apply it to the problem of children or teachers with
AIDS in schools, and we get an obvious conclusion: It's best to be
cautious. We don't know for sure what dangers may be posed by the
presence of HIV+ children or teachers in schools. Perhaps our worst fears
will come true. If prudence means being cautious and playing it safe, we
should probably reason that way. But, in fact, the virtue of prudence
means something quite different from the sort of timid caution that hedges
every bet and constantly endeavors to protect against the worst possible
outcomes. Prudence is openness to reality - an unblinking gaze at what is
the case, a power of discerning the real truth of things. 7
Prudence enables us to see things not as we would like them to be, not
simply as they look from our own self-interested perspective, but as they
are. Hence, it requires an attack upon - or, if we prefer a milder
metaphor, a disciplining of - our egocentric concerns. To see this is to see
why the other three cardinal virtues cannot be present without prudence.
Unless we see things as they really are and not just as we would like them to
be, how shall we possibly respect the just claims of others? Unless we are
free from a timid concern for self-preservation, how can we act
courageously? Unless we know that our desires are not always to be
satisfied, how could there be any place for temperance in our lives?
Prudence, AIDS and Schools
Prudence is openness to reality, a willingness to see what is the case.
What would the prudent man or woman discern when thinking about
AIDS and schools? At least, I think, the following:
(I) We know very little about this disease. Despite the enormous
attention it is now receiving, our knowledge of it is based upon only a few
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years' study. Perhaps much that we think we know will prove eventually to
have been mistaken. Even the standard line taken by public health officials
- that the HIV virus cannot be transmitted through casual daily contact
- need not be taken as gospel truth. After all, researchers once believed
that hepatitis B could not be transmitted through casual contact - and
now know better. We understand, of course, why public health officials
have tended to be so dogmatic and absolutist in their pronouncements.
They are attempting to overcome reactions grounded chiefly in fear and
panic. But a genuinely scientific temperament ought to make one hesitate
before issuing blanket pronouncements on the basis of relatively limited
study. Since it appears that the scientific temperament has not
accomplished this, perhaps we should appeal to the virtue of prudence.
The first fault to be avoided when inculcating prudence, Cicero wrote in
his De Officiis, is "an over-great hastiness and rashness in giving up our
assent, presuming that we know things before we really do SO."8 A genuine
openness to reality will, therefore, be keenly aware of how little we know.
It will see that a danger of which the risk is slight may still be considerable if
the danger is lethal. It will be sensitive, not condescending, to the concerns
of fearful parents. When they see dentists working on their teeth with
masks and rubber gloves , when they listen to the casual conversations of
health care personnel who are not, at the moment, issuing public
pronouncements, they may wonder just what the risks really are . These
fears should not be dismissed. If children with AIDS are to attend public
schools, if teachers with AIDS are to continue teaching, the case should
not for the present be made simply on the ground that parental fears are
conclusively known to be the fruit of hysteria and ignorance. That would
be, I think, the wrong ground upon which to reach the right conclusion.
(2) If we gaze without blinking at the real truth , we will not fail to notice
one more thing - a consideration which points in a rather different
direction . The danger that AIDS may be transmitted in school settings
comes not simply - perhaps not even chiefly - from students or teachers
who actually have the disease. With them, considerable care is likely to be
exercised, and if they will not or cannot exercise such care, we have good
reason to place at least some restrictions upon their liberty. The greater
danger may come from those students or teachers who are HIV+ and do
not know it, those in whom the disease has not yet manifested itself. In
some school systems these will be few; in others, perhaps, not just a few . If
our concern were really the possible transmission of a communicable
disease, we would need to find these people. Yet, to do so would require a
far-reaching program of screening for AIDS antibodies, and it seems
unlikely that we are ready to accept the costs which would be involved whether in dollars or infringements on liberty. Obviously, it could be done.
We already require children attending school to have physical
examinations from physicians at certain moments in their school careers.
But until we are ready to do this, or think we must do this, we are really
dealing only with those cases that come to our attention. If this is all we
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think it right to do, there seems little warrant for unduly restricting the
liberty of those actually known to have the disease.
All this may seem fairly obvious. But I think the prudent person will
discern something more in the problem we face - uncertainty, possible
danger, understandable fear in the face of such uncertainty and danger. If,
as I think would usually be the case, we should decide to permit a child with
AIDS to attend school in as unrestricted a setting as possible, what shall
we then say to the parents of the uninfected children? I have already
suggested that it may be imprudent to take our stand on the claim that risks
are minimal - in part because those claims could turn out to be mistaken,
but more fundamentally because the problem goes deeper. The question to
be faced is not simply, What is the likelihood of transmission of this
disease? It is , Should parents' fundamental instinct be only to protect their
children from danger and suffering? Is that what reality, the truth of
things, requires of us as parents?
Parents and Prudence
Of course, a parent is always, in part, guardian, caretaker, and protector
- quite properly so. But parents deceive themselves if they imagine that
they can ever be, in any ultimate sense, the guarantors of their children's
lives. A prudent man or woman will discern this truth: that, finally, we
have no choice but to hand our children over, permit them to risk suffering
and even death. A prudent man or woman will not give in to the selfdeception by which we imagine the parental role to be well-nigh godlike.
Prudence means, first of all, avoidance of such self-deception.
Indeed, we must press this point one step further. If prudence means
openness to reality, we should ask : What sort of reality? Are the powers
that govern our world ultimately trustworthy? If not, perhaps it is no
surprise that our most fundamental urge should be to protect those we love
most, to try to protect them even when we know that it is finally a losing
game. But suppose we have some basis for trust - for believing that
suffering and even death are not evils out of which no good at all can come.
If and when prudence discerns a reality which is trustworthy, it may make
considerable difference in our deciding and doing. perhaps our basis for
trust will simply be the ongoing march of human technological
achievement : that the disease we have spread we will learn to cure.
Perhaps, though, that power may seem insufficient to ground our trust.
This may, then, be a moment in which the natural virtue of prudence
stands in need of a theological virtue like hope. That, at least, is a
possibility we ought not dismiss.
Prudence discerns the truth of things - what is really good . The virtue
of justice tries to make that vision of goodness take shape in the world. It's
easy enough to say that to be treated justly is to be given one's due. But it is
much harder to give that formal principle some material content, to ask
what actually is due one person or another.
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Sometimes, of course, what justice requires is relatively clear. if we
undertake a contractual obligation, our creditor is entitled to something.
But larger political questions of distributive justice are seldom as clear.
What is due each of us as members of a community is simply ajust share in
what is common to all. And there are occasions when the community, for
the sake of its general well-being, may require that we sacrifice otherwise
legitimate claims. However hard such decisions may be, they remind us
that justice - the fundamental good of politics - is not love, mercy, or
pity.
Thus, for example, in his Journal of the Plague Year, Defoe's narrator
reports that, in homes where the plague had struck, a quarantine was
effected - with a watchman outside and, upon the door, a large red cross
with the words, "Lord, have mercy upon us." The saddler sees clearly that
the sacrifice this demanded, even of some who were well, was considerable.
Indeed reading his entire account, we see that he thought such quarantine
unwise. But his moral judgment is the following:
It is true that the locking up the doors of people's houses, and setting a
watchman there night and day to prevent their stirring out or any coming to them,
when perhaps the sound people in the family might have escaped if they had been
removed from the sick, looked ve ry hard and cruel; and many people perished in
these miserable confinements .... But it was a public good that justified the
private mischief .... 9

That public good must always be considered. We must treat all members of
the community equally, but that does not mean we must treat them
identically. To be sure, this is a truth to be careful with, especially in the
realm of education. It has been used to justify separate but equal schools
for children of different races. But, more positively, the same truth
warrants our making special provisions for the learning disabled child or
the especially gifted child. We do not necessarily deny anyone equal
consideration when we treat differently those who are different in
important and morally relevant ways. Everything depends upon the
circumstances.
Restrictions Based Upon Illness
This means that we do not necessarily wrong a child with AIDS if we
restrict his educational possibilities in one way or another. There are, in
our history, court decisions that have permitted quarantine of people with
communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, diphtheria, and smallpox.
The liberty of anyone - student or teacher - can be restricted if that
person poses a severe enough threat to public health.
When might school officials with justice treat the child with AIDS
differently and restrict his freedom? There is, of course, room here for
honest disagreement, but at least this much seems reasonable: (a) It is just
to take into account the behavior of a child with AIDS.IO A child whose
behavior, for whatever reason, is very aggressive - who scratches and
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bites - may call for more restriction than another child. A teenager who
regards sexual activity as his right may call for more restriction." (b) It is
just to take into account the developmental level ofthe child with AIDS. A
pre-school child who cannot yet govern his own behavior may need more
restriction than older children. (c) It isjust to take into account the physical
condition of the child with AIDS . A child with oozing lesions, or a
neurologically handicapped child lacking control of bodily secretions,
may call for more restriction.
In such cases, justice may permit - even require - restrictions on
liberty. These are decisions , we should emphasize, for public officials, for
distributive justice is a public, political good . Parents as parents need not
- and should not - make the general good their primary aim. We should
expect parents of infected children to seek the best education available for
their children, and to press their claims in the pu blic forum . And we should
expect parents of uninfected children to show proper concern for the
continued health of their children. Neither should be disparaged for
enacting with loyalty their parental office. It is public officials who must
seek out the path to justice in such cases. Theirs is a hard task, harder in
some ways than showing pity or mercy. And yet, it is not pitiless or
unmerciful. For even when public officials reckon with the truth that
liberty may justly be restricted for the sake of communal well-being, they
should not forget that a community may be only as strong as its weakest
member. The character ofthe common life we share will be revealed in the
way we treat those who are weakest.
Perhaps I here begin to suggest or call for more than justice alone can
require. We should remember, though, that justice does not exist apart
from that prudence which sees the truth of things - and the truth is that
justice alone is never quite enough. No community will flourish - perhaps
even survive - unless some of its members are sometimes prepared to give
what cannot exactly be called their just obligation. It may be that here
again we run up against the limits of natural virtue. Perhaps our common
life, if it is to be a flourishing one, will need something that goes a little
beyond justice. Call it simply a spirit of generosity, unless, of course, we
recognize here the theological virtue of love.
What the Virtues Do

Prudence discerns the truth of things: what is really good. Justice gives
external form to that vision in the world we inhabit. Courage and
temperance enable us to act justly.
Courage is not recklessness . It does not ignore the truth of things
discerned by prudence. From this angle also, therefore, we can understand
and sympathize with the fears of parents. Parents should not be foolhardy,
nor ask their children to be. A certain fear of what is evil or dangerous is
quite appropriate. In fact, the virtue of courage presupposes the legitimacy
of such fear. Were there nothing to fear, courage would be unnecessary.
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And being courageous is not the same as having no fear.
If courage does not do away with fear, what is its role? It keeps us from
being controlled by our fears, keeps us from committing inj ustice simply
because we are afraid. We can note here how the virtues interweave and
interpenetrate. We can understand a little of what Socrates meant in
arguing that the virtues are one and that we could not have one virtue
without the others. I have treated justice as prior to courage: first we see
what is just, and then courage enables us to do it. But, clearly, one might
also say that courage is prior - that without courage our vision may be so
clouded by fear that we will fail even to discern what justice requires.
Courage closes our ears to the noisy, insistent claims of anxious selfinterest and thereby makes justice possible.
It is all the more to be regretted, therefore, that ours has become a
culture in which courage is little esteemed, sometimes even scorned. For
then we find that we do not have it ready at hand in moments like these
when our public life needs it. Of course, parents cannot be courageous for
their children or force their children to be courageous. But they can
encourage them to act as a courageous person would. They can help to
instill this virtue in their children by teaching proper fear, but also by
encouraging a willingness to accept risk and insecurity. I do not wish to
overrate courage. In the face of truly great danger, perhaps more than
courage is needed - something closer to what the theological tradition has
called faith or trust. But even if it cannot provide all that we need in the face
of danger and crisis, the virtue of courage dare not be ignored. Without it,
no justice is possible.
Not courage alone, but also temperance is necessary if we are to act
justly. There is much that might be said about the virtue oftemperance, but
perhaps, in our context, one thing that must be said. When we come to
think about this last of the cardinal virtues, it will not escape our attention
that AIDS is a sexually transmitted disease. And within the tradition of
virtue as it developed in the West, one ofthe characteristics of a temperate
person is chastity.
It comes as no surprise, then, that the AIDS crisis has forced us to
consider again the question of sex education. One need not oppose all sex
education in order to be concerned about the manner in which the
argument for it is commonly made. Ronald Sider has made the point well:
"If we are trying to warn adolescent youngsters about the dangers of
promiscuity, I doubt we do it effectively by a TV ad featuring (to take one
current example) a glamorous young woman who says she wants love, but
is not willing to die for it."12 By way of contrast, Sider suggests the kind of
language that, though encouraging condom use by the promiscuous,
would not at the same time enhance the lure of exactly such promiscuity.
Why not, he asks, a commercial featuring an AIDS patient at a stage of the
disease no one could find appealing. A voice could then say:
The only safe sex is within a lifelong monogamous relationship. I wish I had lived
that way before I got AIDS. But if, in spite of to day's harsh facts, you want to play
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Russian roulette with your life, then please use condoms. They are not fail-proof,
but they do improve your chances. 13

We almost laugh, do we not? For our sensibilities are jarred, so uncommon
is it to see the virtue of chastity actually playa role in what we term "safe
sex" education.
A cultural tradition that can respond to a threat like AIDS only with
purportedly "value-free" instruction about "safe sex" is very probably a
worn out tradition. At the very least we should be clear that this sort of
instruction is not about chastity, nor about the virtue of temperance. It is,
instead, about satisfying our desires as often as possible, while at the same
time doing what we can to avoid unfortunate consequences. Sex has never
been value-free in human life, never just a natural function untouched by
personal human significance. Chastity names the trait of character which
sees that the person is involved when the body is given or used, and that
such giving or use should not be separated from a bond of love and
permanent commitment.
A still more important point must also be made. There is a connection
between intemperance and injustice. Intemperance is not simply a private
vice. When I want, above all else, something for myself, it is probable that I
will soon overlook the needs and claims of others - needs which injustice
should claim my attention. Being intemperate, I am likely also to be unjust.
Something like this will have to be said if we want to speak truly and teach
truly about the human good of sexuality. To aim at the satisfaction of one's
desire is something quite different from the commitment of lover and
beloved.
This is the language of virtue, the language of our moral inheritance,
language that points to the full realization of human capacities. Central to
such flourishing are the virtues of prudence, justice, courage, and
temperance. In part these virtues direct our attention to considerations
that may bear upon our decisions and actions. But the great strength of this
emphasis upon virtue is that it directs our attention to inescapable features
of human life in community - the good of health, the evil of sickness, the
power offear, the danger of anxious self-interest, the need for sacrifice, the
responsibilities attached to the offices we fill, the complexity of the moral
life. If we must face social crises, we will be better prepared for having
learned to look at them from this angle of vision; for this is a rich moral
tradition, and we may hope that it still retains the power to enrich our
reflection upon the crises we face .
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Don't miss it!
The 1988 annual meeting oj the National
Federation oj Catholic Physicians' Guilds will be
held at the A /lis Plaza Hotel in Kansas City,
Missouri, Oct. 14, 15 and 16.
Hear topnotch speakers on subjects oj vital
interest.
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